Master's Thesis
“ARABISM
BELONGS TO BOTH MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS”.
Mr. Hafez Al-Assad the late President of the Syrian Arab Republic
THE EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP OF THE CHRISTIAN MINORITY AND THE STATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SYRIA.
TUFTS UNIVERSITY
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Global Master
of Arts program 2002-2003
Master’s thesis
Copyright 2007 © All rights reserved. Designed By: Mays Domat
By Hind Aboud Kabawat
Presented to
Professor JOHN HAMMOCK
JULY 18, 2003
To my Mom and Dad, Uncle Emil and Samuel, who always watch over me…
To my children
John and Nouha Maria who represent the future of the two lands I cherish
The Greatest Syria and my beautiful Canada
Special thanks: To my great team, Brett, Davey, Ingrid, John and Sean, ( I could not do it without their support).
To my advisor: Professor Hammock who changed my view of life through his inspiring and powerful lectures.
To Dean Deborah Nutter: Who helped me to understand the essential role of leadership.
Thanks for being my friends: Anne, Charlotte, Gabriel, Gemma, George, Ginette, Haya, Ibrahim, Houda, Jason, Joumana, Katia, Kiat, Omar, Rafif, Robert , Sahar, Samer, Sonia and Yvone. .
TABLE OF CONTENT
THE CONUNDRUM CONFRONTING CHRISTIANS IN THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST
EMIGRATION, THE FAIL-SAFE OPTION FOR CHRISTIAN ARABS
THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE CHRISTIAN/MUSLIM RELATIONSHIP IN THE MIDDLE
EAST
CHRISTIANS IN THE MUSLIM EMPIRE:
CHRISTIANS WITHIN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE:
CHRISTIANS AND THE MODERN ARAB STATE:
Section D:
KEEPING THE FAITH:
CONTEMPORARY SYRIANS AND THE COMMITMENT TO SECULAR ARAB SOCIETY
Section A:
IDENTITY AND DESTINY:
THE CONUNDRUM CONFRONTING CHRISTIANS
IN THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST
Christian Arabs are in a unique position to be the defenders of secularism in the face of rising Muslim fundamentalism.
In a remarkable book, "In the Name of Identity," the distinguished Lebanese/French writer Amin Maalouf vividly discusses the complexity of being at one and the same time an Arab and a Christian in the contemporary Middle East. From Maalouf's perspective speaking Arabic, which he terms "the holy language of Islam," connects him to a rich cultural and political tradition that is deeply Muslim and eastern, while being a Christian, whether religious or not, connects him to a world which is much more western, secular, and humanist.
Let me quote a passage which captures the essence of what Maalouf's perceives to be a paradoxical dilemma: The challenges of being deeply engaged with two global communities that are frequently at odds with each other, while at the same time sharing many similar traditions.
Amin Maalouf writes:
"Speaking Arabic creates bonds between me and all those who use it every day in their prayers...If, for instance, you are in central Asia and meet an elderly scholar outside a Timuride ‘medersa,’ you need only address him in Arabic for him to feel at ease. Then he will speak to you from his heart, as he'd never risk doing in Russian or English. This language is common to us all--to him, me and to more than a billion others. On the other hand, my being a Christian--regardless of whether I am deeply religious or merely for sociological reasons--also creates a significant link between me and two billion or so other Christians around the world. There are many things in which I differ from every Christian, every Arab and every Muslim, but between me and each of them there is also an undeniable kinship, in one case religious and intellectual and in the other linguistic and cultural."(1)
Being "intimately" involved with two great cultural traditions clearly has its advantages. Does it perhaps allow Christians in the Middle East to play the role of honest broker between Arabs and westerners? Maybe. Or are they more likely to be caught in the crossfire? Also a distinct possibility. But arguably the major legacy of being both Arab and Christian in the Middle East is that you are, a member of a minority in your own society, and as Amin Maalouf writes this is "not always easy to accept." (2) Ever since the Islam triumphed over Christianity in the seventh century, to become the dominant religious force in the Middle East, Christians have been a minority within Arab society. Sometimes tolerated; occasionally oppressed. Still, throughout the long historical arc of its relationship with the Muslim majority, it survived and often flourished. Perhaps possibly till now. Why? Because, likely, at the very core of the Christian community in the Middle East is a profound paradox. Which I seek to explain in this paper.
Section B:
EMIGRATION, THE FAIL-SAFE OPTION FOR CHRISTIAN ARABS
Never before have Christians enjoyed as much political equality and religious tolerance as they do presently in most Arab societies in the Middle East. Syria (until recently was Iraq, as well) is run by a secular party, the Baaths, ideologically committed to keeping church and state separate. In Egypt, the large Coptic Christian minority wields disproportionate influence in political affairs, as do Christians in Jordan. And while Lebanon has not returned to the equal constitutional division of powers between Christians and Muslim, which was the case before the civil war of the 1980s, both communities, under the new political arrangements, enjoy significant influence in affairs of state. Clearly Christians do not enjoy much influence in Saudi Arabia, or most of the Gulf states, but neither do they constitute a significant community in the region.
So, if it is accepted that Christian minorities enjoy greater tolerance and influence than ever before, why does it sometimes appear that Christians constitute a community diminishing in size and importance? For proof, look no further than the population and emigration statistics. For a variety of reasons, which this paper shall explore, Christian communities throughout the Middle East have been shrinking in size at the same time as they’ve been constitutionally guaranteed more civil, political and religious rights. Just consider some statistics. In his essay, "The Emigration of Christian Arabs: Dimensions and Causes of the Phenomenon," a sociologist at the University of Bethlehem, Bernard Sabella, estimates that between 26.5% to 34.1% of the entire Christian population of the Middle East has already emigrated. Others believe the numbers are much higher. At the fifth annual general meeting of The Middle East Council of Churches, held in January, 1990, it was estimated that the number of Arab Christians worldwide was 15-million, and the number living "in diaspora" was 10-million. (3) In other words, two-thirds lived abroad in Europe, the Americas, Australia, etc. Over the last few decades, the size of the Christian community in Syria, alone, is estimated to have contracted from 15% to 8%.
The reasons behind this massive outflow of Christians to Europe, the Americas, Australia, are varied and complex, and while it is true that in recent years Muslim emigration from the Middle East has also risen dramatically, there is no question that the movement overseas of Arab Christians has had a much greater impact on their community than a similar emigration has had on the Muslim majority in large part because the Christian community is so much smaller. The attraction of the west to the Arab Christians is equal parts economic, political and cultural. And that "gravitational pull" westwards speaks directly to the issues of identity raised earlier by Amin Maalouf.
So why does the West hold such allure for Arab Christians? Let’s look first at historic and cultural issues. Beginning as far back as the early nineteenth century, European and American missionaries, with their schools, and other social organizations, had a profound impact on Christian communities in the Middle East. Long before western values had a similar impact on the Muslim majority, Arab Christians benefited from western education and values, which resulted in their playing a disproportionately prominent role in business, politics, civil administration and culture. Quite simply, Christians "leveraged" their cultural and religious relationship with the West to acquire skills somewhat earlier than their Muslim bothers. This does not mean that all Arab Christians are wealthy and well-educated, or that there are no poor or working class Christians. That is clearly not the case. But beginning early on, the values, which Arab Christians share with their religionists in the West, resulted in their enjoying options not initially shared by their Muslim brothers. Again, let’s look at emigration statistics.
Beginning as early as the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Arab Christians emigrated to Europe and North and South America in significant numbers, and as a result most middle-class Arab Christian families in the region have relatives in Buenos Aires, or Boston, or elsewhere. As Bernard Sabella notes, there is "a much higher percentage of Christians [than Muslims] intending to emigrate because of the presence of relatives abroad "(4) so, when life became difficult in the Middle East, the option to leave was (and is) clearly available. Again, look at the statistics. For over fifty years, the Middle East has been a region in political and economic turmoil, and after ever-significant geopolitical crisis, the Christian community contracted. According to Bernard Sabella, only 42.5% of Palestinian Christians, or 170,000 people, still live in Palestine/Israel. About 230,000 Christian Palestinians live abroad, in the Diaspora. In the wake of the Civil War in Lebanon, it is estimated that over 990,000 people, or forty percent of the population of the entire country, left, the majority of them Christian. An estimated 300,000 Maronites, alone departed. (5)
And though it is a much harder phenomenon to track, Christians are much more likely to move whenever they feel threatened by the emergence of Muslim fundamentalism, which many feel directly, threatens their own identity and security. As well, Christians are more likely to feel compelled to emigrate in search of political and civil rights enjoyed by most societies in the West and sometimes absent in more rigidly controlled traditional Middle Eastern societies. As Bernard Sabella notes, "Whenever there is doubt about the possibility of a democratic pluralist society, fears are aroused and sensitivities grow to become stumbling blocks in inter-communal relations."(6) The consequence is a further hemorrhaging of Christians from the Middle East.
Section C:
TOLERANCE AND TORMENT:
THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE CHRISTIAN/MUSLIM RELATIONSHIP IN THE MIDDLE EAST
CHRISTIANS IN THE MUSLIM EMPIRE:
If Christians are a community in flux, it is also one with a tradition of coexisting with its Muslim brother, which dates back over one and a half millennia. Let us look briefly at the contours of that long historic relationship, and the legacy it has left us today. When Prophet Mohammed began preaching his gospel in Mecca between 610-622, he came in contact with both Christians and Jews and he coined the expression "Ahl al-Kitab" ("Peoples of the Book") to describe them. The founder of Islam perceived Christians to be, like Muslims, believers who possessed a written revelation, a holy book. Ever after, this distinction between those who were "people of the book," and those who weren’t, influenced Islam’s relationship with infidels, or unbelievers. Those without a "book" could expect little mercy from Muslim conquerors: convert, or face dire consequences. But to the latter, he extended an olive branch. They could coexist, as long as both Jews and Christians submitted to the political will of Islam.
As Samir Khalil Samir notes in his essay, "The Christian Communities, Active Members of Arab Society throughout History," Prophet Mohammed offered Jews and Christians an arrangement for coexistence in a document called the "Sahifa." "In this model, people are not considered directly, but as members of a group; if the group has a status, then the people belonging to it will have the same status. If the group does not have a status, then the person is distinctly marginalized."(7) This system was termed the "dhimma" in Arabic, and it defined communal relations between Muslims, on the one hand, and Christians and Jews, on the other, for many centuries to come. As Samir writes, "Muslims had a duty to protect these groups and their members and in exchange they were obliged to submit to the Muslim regime. The aim was to build a Muslim society in which those people who did not belong to Islam were tolerated. This is how the expression ‘tolerance,’ referring to Islam, was derived."
But key to the dhimma system was tolerance not equality, or acceptance. And for Christians (and Jews) to be tolerated, they paid a price: Strict adherence to certain rules. These rules were based on the famous "conditions of Umar," a document attributed to Caliph Umar who died in 644, and in which the "dos" and "don’ts" of "minority status" were graphically delineated. Christians and Jews could practice their religion, but not too visibly. As Samir observes, "Christians must not carry or wear a visible cross; they must not put a large cross on top of the church, conduct processions outside the church, or ring bells...The church or synagogue must not be too tall; the building must be more modest than all the Muslim religious buildings in the area."(8) Conversion to Christianity, or Judaism, was strictly forbidden. If a Christian Women married a Muslim man, the children would be raised as Muslims, and a Christian man could only marry Muslim women if he converted beforehand. Over the centuries Christians paid special taxes--the "jizya" (a head tax) and the "kharja" (the land tax)--to practice their religion, and in many communities Christians and Jews were obligated to wear special clothes to distinguish them from the Muslim majority.
Still, for centuries the dhimma system worked quite well. As Samir notes, "There were no persecutions in the Muslim empire. There were exceptions, but they were rare...and in comparison to the Western medieval system, the system of the dhimma was more than satisfactory in terms of the freedom it allowed certain subordinate religious groups. If you had no political demands, if you did not aspire to power of any kind, everything was fine. You were free to develop within your own culture and your own religion, as long as you accepted the supremacy of Islam and its right to islamicize the population, without the right to proselytize for Christians or Jews."(9)
Mind you, there are those who argue that Mohammed and the early Muslims had little choice but to tolerate the Christian Arabs. When they stormed out of the Arabian Peninsula, Prophet Mohammed and his followers encountered a civilization much more advanced than their own nomadic provincial society. Though infused with a religious ideology which viewed itself as a universal culture that regulated all aspects of daily life, it was evident even to the early Muslims that Christian Arabs, better educated in Western ideas and mores, were indispensable to the administration of a Muslim empire that had been conquered more by force than divine revelation, or brain power.
In his book "Christian Communities in the Arab Middle East," the Italian historian Andrea Pacini notes, "Christians had an active and often little known role in the development of Arab culture...With their knowledge of Greek and Syriac and their Hellenistic and Bystantine cultural background, the Eastern Christians played a fundamental role as mediators between this culture and the Arab Muslims, both as regards state administration and purely cultural matters. They therefore made an essential contribution to the emergence of the new synthesis of Islamic culture and philosophy, which built on the Greek cultural heritage. It was the Christian philosophers in fact who played an active and creative role by translating the most important Greek philosophers, such as Aristotle and Plato, and the neo-Platonists, from Greek or Syriac into versions of Arabic. Particularly when the Abbasid Empire was formed in 750 and the capital was moved to Baghdad, the caliphs boosted culture greatly and encouraged the spread of Greek works throughout the Arab empire. For this they mainly relied on Christians, who as important cultural mediators in the Arab world, laid the foundations for the subsequent development of science and philosophy in the Arab world."(10)
So though Muslims often like to assert that their culture flourished when Europe was mired in the Dark Ages, it was a culture whose foundation was laid by their Christian Arab brethren. Paradoxically, however, the influence of Arab Christians began to wane around the 10th century, perhaps early foreshadowing what may be happening in the Middle East, today, as the size and possibly the importance of the Christian minority would appear to be decreasing. To Pacini, this relative decline "made it more difficult for [Christians] to play an important role in Arab society."(11) (What was true then, may be true today.) The reasons behind Christian decline are not hard to decipher. Though the "dhimma system" encouraged tolerance, it seriously inhibited dynamic growth within the community. Laboring under endless restrictions, Arab Christians dwindled in numbers and influence.
CHRISTIANS WITHIN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE:
Christian fortunes didn’t reverse until the 17th century with the emergence of the Ottoman Empire. And the beginning was not promising. When the Ottomans undertook the first census of their empire in 1570, Christians composed a scant 8 per cent of the population. But over the next three and a half centuries, the Christian community thrived under the auspices of the Ottoman sultans, and as Pacini notes, this resulted in "an extraordinary numerical increase on the one hand and a restoration of their importance in social and cultural life on a large scale."(12)
So why did Christians prosper under the Ottomans while they declined under the dhimma system of the Muslim empire, which had been the institutionalized status quo for over a thousand years? Historian Samir Khalil Samir believes much of the explanation can be sourced to events reshaping European politics and society, and how first Christians and then their Ottoman overlords reacted to these changes. Argues Samir, "The age of the Enlightenment, the American revolution, and especially the French revolution, brought different approaches to the concept of liberty. The result was that Christians began to make more claims, not for special privileges, but for equal rights, both for themselves and others."(13)
The response of the Ottomans to both "external changes" and "internal demands" was actually quite enlightened. First, they transformed the status of Christians from "dhimmi"--essentially tolerated, protected outcasts--into something resembling citizenship. And they did so, in part, to placate the Europeans powers whom Arab Christians had enlisted to plead their case in Istanbul.
Organizationally, the Sultan divided the Empire, for administrative purposes, into a system of "millets" (nations) through which it gave legal recognition to the multi-religious composition of the Empire. In the beginning only four millets were recognized--Muslim, Jewish, Greek Orthodox and Armenia--but under pressure from European states over the course of the nineteenth century other religious denominations were given official status. Within the millets, each group enjoyed relative freedom, equality, and autonomy. Now, this system of identifying an individual’s social identity, and their citizenship, around their religion has deep roots in the Middle East. But by the late nineteenth century, the millet (sectarian religious) system confronted another trend, which would transform Middle Eastern politics and society: Arabism, or pan-Arabism. So while it is true that the millet system dramatically expanded the "rights" of non-Muslim peoples, it did nothing to assuage a growing desire for Arabs to see themselves as one community, an ulama. A whole people.
Still, without question, the Christian community flourished under Ottoman rule, and towards the end of the Empire, Christians accounted for 24% of the population of the Empire. In the area then called Greater Syria (presently Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Palestine), the figure rose to 30%. As the Christian communities grew in numbers, wealth and influence, they expressed their yearning for a larger role in society through a movement called "the Nahda" (Arabic for” rebirth"). Originally a movement to reform the Catholic church within Syria and Lebanon, it transformed into a movement whose aim was to bring the cultural, scientific and technological progress underway in Europe and the Americas to the Arab world. As Samir Khalil Samir argues, this rebirth was evident in all aspects of life: economics, politics, literature, science, philosophy, culture, art and so on. "All the modern ideas at the beginning of the 20th century, a time of unbridled liberalism, were transmitted through Arab Christians, to the newspapers and journals which they edited in Cairo, Alexandria and Beirut... It was a real explosion of life and freedom which was expressed by every means."(14)
Not that the Muslims were unaffected by the challenges posed to Ottoman and Arab society by progress in the West. In an intriguing book called "Three Reformers, A Study in Modern Arab Thought," historian Khaldun S. Al-Husry examines the influence of three nineteenth-century Muslim thinkers on the movement to "modernize" the Arab world. As al-Husry notes in the book’s introduction, his choice of "Muslim" intellectuals was deliberate because "any investigation of modern Arab political thought must deal primarily with the problems of adaptation and reconciliation of Islamic thought and institutions with the thought of the Christian West. Christian Arab thinkers do not have to face these problems."(15)
Among the most insightful of these thinkers is Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi, a renaissance man who was born a slave but ended up a senior courtier to the Ottoman sultan at the end of the nineteenth century. To Khayr al-Din, the true source of Western power, prosperity and progress was the political systems of European states which, he argued, were based on justice, liberty and, arguably most importantly, the rule of "man-made" (not religious) law. As al-Husry writes, "Khayr as-Din discerns in these systems an absence of despotic and arbitrary rule, responsible government, and the sovereignty of law."(16)
The Ottoman responded to these demands for a more civil western society through a series of reforms. Among the most important was the Tanzimat ("regulations"), which modified the Islamic "shari’a," Koranic religious law, with a secular civil code. But such reforms only partially mollified a Christian community increasingly restive about restrictions inherent in the sectarian millet system. As it turned out, the Sultan’s reforms were too little too late for an Empire disintegrating from its own internal contradictions. Both Christians in the Balkans and the Arabs in Greater Syria balked at being under the control of a Turkoman-based regime in Istanbul. In Greater Syria, the outlet for this discontent was an Arabism, which could be shared by both Christians and Muslims. All that was needed to topple the Ottomans was a gentle push; the First World War had to suffice.
CHRISTIANS AND THE MODERN ARAB STATE:
With the total collapse of the Ottoman empire after World War I, so-called Arab separatism transformed into an Arab nationalism, in the guise of a group of new Arab states in the former Greater Syria, under the control of the League of Nations’ "mandated" powers, Britain and France. Within these new political arrangements, Christians faced new challenges, and some unanswered questions. Would they be as secure as CO-citizens with their Arab Muslim brothers as they had been under the "protection" of the Sultan. In his book, "The Arab Christian, A History in the Middle East," the historian Kenneth Cragg puts the issue succinctly. "If Arab Islam had thus come to terms with its national destinies from the 1920s on, Christian Arabs, by the same token, had to reckon with their new condition as Co-citizens, no longer contractually protected as subordinates--with all the vagaries that entailed--but in some sense partners in the jostling fortunes of statehood."(17)
To Kenneth Cragg, the Christian Arabs in Syria were most strenuously involved in the conflicts of regional identity and Arab unity. "Their dilemmas with Islam in that context pointed them strongly toward secular solutions of the perennial problems within and between faiths."(18) But how would this new secularism be achieved in a society, which had for a millennia delicately balanced the competing demands of ethnicity and religious belief? One thing was certain: What was true in Syria resonated in Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, etc.
The foundations for a secular Arab nationalism had been laid with the "Nahda," the Arab rebirth. But as Andrea Pacini notes, "The aim of the Nahda was the political, social and economic renewal of Arab society, and it considered Arab identity as the common base for this. Emphasizing Arab identity therefore gave an ideological base for the construction of national independence and also meant that both Muslims and Christians could be involved in constituting modern states, as religious differences were integrated into the idea of a common Arab identity."(19)
But behind this grand secular rhetoric there was always an issue just under the radar screen: Did the Muslim majority "buy into" this fundamental premise? As Pacini notes, there was always two currents of thought about the "Nahda" among Muslim. One, deeply secular, and another "which considered Islam to be the predominant cultural feature of Arab identity and called for it to be recognized as such."(20) In the decades following the full independence of Arab societies in the Middle East, following the Second World War, this tension--this dialectic, if you will--between secularists and Islamicists would surge and wane. But it was always there.
In the initial phases of Arab nation building after the Second World War, it is obvious Christians had disproportionate influence. As Pacini argues, "The cultural development of the Christians in the preceding decades, and their exposure to Western liberal ideas, resulted in their having undeniable influence within different movements for national independence and cultural renewal."(21) And in the beginning, at least, much of the Muslim elite were favorable to a State, which depended on common national citizenship and not on religious affiliation. Adds Pacini, "This choice of secularism was a clear symbol of their break with the tribal Ottoman past and their entry into the modern world."
So how successful has been this political project: the transformation of Arab society into secular states where Christians and Muslims could live together in peace and equality? Both Iraq and Syria were governed for decades by the Baath Party, whose founding principles were deeply secular, and the founder of the Syrian branch of the party, Michel ‘Aflaq, was himself a Christian. In Egypt, the Coptic Christian community had a major role in the Wafd nationalist party, also essentially secular in nature. But was this commitment to secularism matched by one to democracy and pluralism? To Pacini, "democratic structures within most of these secular political organizations were in most cases fragile and they often regressed towards nationalistic authoritarian governments."(22) From his perspective this happened in Syria, Iraq, and Egypt, and this increasing nationalist authoritarianism led many Christians to distance themselves from the national cause--and emigrate.
Even Christian secularists like Michel ‘Aflaq were not averse to sentiments strangely more sectarian than secular. In his book, "To the Memory of an Arab Prophet," "Aflaq argues for something akin to Christian "assimilation" "Arab nationalism will only fully awaken in Christians," he writes, "when they understand that Islam is a national culture which they must assimilate till they understand and love it. Then they will be devoted to Islam as to the dearest aspect of their Arabism."(23) But is such assimilation likely among communities which have spent decades (centuries) oscillating between their "religious identity" and their "Arab ethnicity"? Probably not. Secularism has been the preferred political strategy for Christians precisely because they do not want to assimilate. As historian Kenneth Cragg argues, it was the Baath Party’s raison d'être:, "Was it born primarily in despair at fractious incorrigible sectarianism? Was it, indeed, prescient about the tragic fate awaiting Lebanon?"(24)
So how does secularism work in most Arab societies in the Middle East? Clearly democracy as understood in the West is either stillborn, or floundering. But for the most part secularism has succeeded ( Lebanon)--with the caveat that there is always a clear and present danger of it being swamped by resurgent Islamic fundamentalism. Mind you, it remains secularism with a distinct Middle Eastern hue. Take the Syrian Constitution of 1973, for instance. As Cragg notes, "It affirms that Islam is ‘the religion of the President of the Republic’ and that ‘Muslim law is the principal source of law.’"(25) This is clearly not secularism as understood in the West. But the Syrian Constitution, however, does not declare Islam to be the state religion, and in 1949 Husni al-Za’im had all references to religious affiliation eliminated from Syrian identity cards. As Bernard Botiveau noted in his essay, "The Law of the Nation State and the Status of non-Muslims in Egypt and Syria," "this assured that individual and collective rights would not be determined by religious affiliation."(26)
As well, Syrian reforms to laws around personal status (in 1953 and 1975) have tended to harmonize laws for Muslims and non-Muslims. As Botiveau notes, "For Muslims, these included new restrictions on polygamy and the obligation to conform to the laws of the civil State...In a corresponding fashion, non-Muslims were also subjected to this type of reform."(27) Not surprisingly, in such a traditional society, such secular reforms encountered serious resistance from Muslim fundamentalists and in the early 1980s the Muslim Brothers openly challenged the Baathist Constitution of 1973, and the ulemas, the governing religious bodies, demanded that Islamic law become the main source of legislation, and the shari’a, Koranic holy law, be fully applied. As Botiveau notes, "The Alevite government’s suppression of the Muslin Brothers in 1982 silenced the Islamist movement and forced it to go underground."(28)
The Muslim Brothers revolt likely reaffirmed support of the Christian community for the Baath government in Damascus. But if the threat of a more radically politicized Islam has been suppressed for now, will it be forever? That question looms large on the Arab Christian political horizon. To answer that question, experts constantly monitor political trends in the region. Which factors are fundamentally shaping the political culture of Arab world? And what are the implications for the Christian minority? To Andrea Pacini, three main social and political directions characterize the contemporary Middle East. "The first is the affirmation of a nationalist policy, particularly evident in Syria, Iraq and Egypt. The second is the emergence and intensification of the process of Islamization, which has increased particularly from 1970 onwards. And the third is the eruption since the 1970s of long, protracted conflicts in both Israel/Palestine and the Gulf."(29)
To many there is a direct link between the resurgence of militant Islam and the oppression of the Arab Regimes, according to the Arab Human Development report 2002, lack of education, low life standard, health, Government are not allowing their citizen to enjoy the freedom of living a daily life, or having a free press, use for the internet without restriction, control the media, the press. And all of all the dictatorship system, also, the financial funding from the United States to some of the Muslim fundamentalism movement like the Tailbone in Afghanistan, and non -ending conflict between Israel and Arabs over the Palestine. For Pacini, it has renewed the importance of religious affiliation and its influence on institutions and society. "The question of the secularity of institutions and the idea of citizenship, both decisive for the status of non-Muslims, are again open to question and in the political debate."(30) For now, under the leadership of the new president, Bashar Assad, the situation in Syria seems stable. In Iraq, under Saadam, the Christian community had become quite marginalized. Though nominally secular, the Iraqi Baath party recognized Islam as the state religion and Christianity had no official status. And aside from being one-man despotism, Iraqi politics was almost feudal, "clan centric." On the whole, the survival strategy of the Christian community was to keep a low profile. How Christians will fare under American occupation remains to be seen.
As members of the largest Christian community in the Arab world, Egyptian Copts have benefited from administrations in Cairo, which, though authoritarian and nationalist, were committed to a secular order. But most experts believe that a period of intense Islamization, both of society and state institutions, is underway. And no one doubts this poses a direct threat to the political rights of the Copts and other religious minorities. Their perceived solution: To ally themselves ever more tightly with the established political order under President Hosni Mubarak. As Dina El Khawaga argues in his essay, "Political Dynamic of the Copts," "the domination of Islam became ‘the common enemy’ of the ruling power and all the ‘legal’ political forces."(31) Other commentators agree. "The improvement in relations between the Egyptian government and the Coptic
Community is part of a wider strategy of the State’s opposition to political Islamization and the Islamic movements," argues Andrea Pacini. (32) Give the tactics of some militant groups the Christian minority has little alternative.
In their campaign to create an Islamic State, ruled by the shari’a, radical Islamic movements often commit acts of violence against the Copts, and some radical Islamic leaders have openly suggested the Copts be reduced to their former status as "dhimmi," marginalized, if tolerated, outcasts. Confronted with such pro vocations to its secular political culture, the Egyptian political establishment has rallied in support of its Christian minority. As Dina El Khawaga notes, "The non-Islamist opposition forces took every opportunity to reaffirm their support for their Coptic co-patriots and vigorously denied the existence of tension between Copts and Muslims. In other words the perception of the Islamic threat, previously felt solely by the Copts, became, or appeared to become at least, the common denominator of the majority of political and social actors."(33)
Section D:
KEEPING THE FAITH:
CONTEMPORARY SYRIANS AND THE COMMITMENT TO SECULAR ARAB SOCIETY
For a secular Arab society to remain vibrant and healthy, mainstream opinion in both the Muslim and Christian communities must remain steadfast in support of a secular political order (as per the Mubarak regime in Cairo). Nowhere are the stakes higher than in Syria with its small but well-established Christian community. Awhile back, I conduced a series of interviews with opinion leaders in both religious communities, and I found the majority remained sanguine about the future of secular society within the country and the region--even in the wake of the Muslim Brothers revolt in Syria in the early 1980s, and the bitter collapse of sectarian peace across the border in Lebanon during its protracted civil war. Indeed, many Syrians (Muslim and Christian) reject the very characterization of Christians as being a "minority" and Muslims a "majority."
"I don’t believe it is politically correct to use the term "minority" to describe citizens who have full rights under the law," argues Sunni Muslim Hussein Odate, the author of a book called "The Christian Arabs."(34) "They have all the freedoms and responsibilities of other citizens: work, travel, trade, military service, so the term is inaccurate." Iskandar Louka, a Baath Party activist, and a Christian shared that sentiment. "Aside from the presidency of the Republic, all positions in society are open to Christians, and they have equal opportunity to advance within this society and economy."(35) Even an active member of the Syrian Communist Party, George Ouisheh, rejected as specious any suggestion that Christians lacked rights enjoyed by Muslims. "There are no differences in Syria; everyone is equal under the law."(36) (More than one noted how for over thirty years, under the Baaths, Christians have been permitted to parade through the streets on Palm Sunday and Good Friday.) When dissent did occur around issue of "minority status," it was among Christians nostalgic for the old days when "westernized" Christians enjoyed "economic" advantages not enjoyed, for the most) part by their Muslim brothers. "I certainly don’t think Christians play the same role in Syria today as they did in the past," comments Nabil Shweiri, a prominent Christian businessman, "and they certainly don’t enjoy the same economic privileges they formerly enjoyed doing business in Europe."(37)
On the issue of whether the secular order is secure, or is threatened by a resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism, opinions vary. "I think secularism has been a big success in Syria," says Bishop Asador Battikha, the head of the Roman Catholic Church in Damascus. "All Syrians want to live together in peace, jointly proud of their culture and heritage."(38) To many, the Baath party remains central to the viability of a secular political order in the country, and many take pride in the Christianity of the party’s founder, Michel Aflaq--although as George Ouisheh notes, "Aflaq was rumoured to have converted to Islam when he believed the party was becoming more Muslim in nature." Still, Ouisheh, a communist, firmly believes the Baath Party is based on tolerance. Perhaps not surprisingly, Iskandar Louka, a party activist, agrees. "The Baath Party is a success because it was founded on the principle of equality for all. As former president Hafez Assad liked to say, ‘Arabism belongs to both Christians and Muslims.’"
But are communal relations in Syria too dependent on a single party whose only serious opposition is a Muslim fundamentalism, which rejects the current consensus? How secure is Syria’s secular political culture? Such questions can provoke sharp divisions and occasional defensiveness. "What threats are you referring to?," responds Hussein Odate. Adds George Ouisheh, "I don’t think Muslims threaten Christians in any serious way; we are all one nation, and any bitterness is usually the result of interference from external forces, like the superpowers." But others are not as optimistic. "Threats to the secular civil order in an old issue in the Middle East," says Nabil Shweiri, "you get used to it." Others, however, believe it is vital to remain vigilant about threats to their community. As Kheir Beik Khaddan, an highly intelligent Alawite journalist, and the daughter-in-law of the Syrian prime minister, notes, "Arab Christians are threatened in many parts of the Middle East, if not in Syria, itself."(39)
As to how Christians should deal with the "threat" of fundamentalism, there seemed no consensus other than strengthening the community’s commitment to a secular non-religious Syrian nationalism. "I don’t believe it is viable for Christians to have an independent policy on this issue of Muslim fundamentalism other than working with progressive forces in the Muslim community," argues Hanan Kheir Beik Khaddam. To Nabil Shweiri, the idea of Christians acting independently in response to fundamentalist threats is, itself, inherently dangerous. "It would be absurd to say there are no fundamentalist sentiments in the country, but it would be equally foolish for Christians to try to deal with the issue independently. Syria will only ‘modernize’ through Islam; to do so any other way would only provoke an extremist reaction."
Such "hands-off" sentiments seem to form the consensus among Syrian Christians. "There should be no independent strategy to deal with any real, or perceived, fundamentalist threat," argues George Ouisheh. ." Others agree. "There should be no independent Christian response to any threat to the secular order," says Iskandar Louka, "only a national one." For Bishop Battikha, "The best defense against political or religious extremism is for Christians to always behave like ‘civilized Arabs.’ Cherish our nationality, our culture, our intellectual heritage."
On whether the Christian community has any special role to play promoting a more open democratic pluralist society, the consensus seemed to be "no," with an occasional caveat. "I think it is everyone’s duty to work for democracy not just the Christians," says Iskandar Louka. "By being open-minded, Muslims and Christians can work together for a free liberated society." "There is a need for both communities (not just Christians) to work to improve human rights and support a free press, free judiciary, etc.," argues Hanan Beik Khaddam. Adds Hussein Odate, "Both societies must work together." Still others, like Nabil Shweiri, think it inappropriate for a minority community, like Syrian Christians, to even contemplate taking such initiatives. "It’s not their role."
Still, the role and identity of Christians within Syrian society remains complex and sometimes elusive. Modern Arab nationalism has been quite successful at defusing many of the communal/ religious divisions, which have for generations plagued Middle Eastern society. But not all of them. As with Amin Maalouf, issues around identity still perplex many Christians. Who am I? Where do I belong? Am I an Arab first, or a Christian? Is my spiritual/cultural home in the East? Or the West? To many contemporary Christians their status as Syrian citizens is the source of their identity. As Hussein Odate notes, "Syrian Christians belong to the Syrian nation." But for others, such nationalism is tempered by a sense of still being torn by rival loyalties. As Hanan Kheir Beik Khaddam observes, "The simple truth is that many Syrian Christians possess two contrary instincts: the sense of being part of their homeland, and the feeling of belonging to a society in the West, a society which is more highly developed and offers greater opportunities for them and their children. The result is every day in this country Christians leave, go abroad."
So what is the impact of being a Christian in a traditional, predominantly Muslim society in the Middle East? That would appear to depend on your perspective, your place in society. To George Ouisheh, the communist, the impact is "very positive." "Christianity started in the East, and influenced the world with its culture and literature." To Nabil Shweiri, the businessman, the impact is "very negative." "That’s why there has been this massive migration of Arab Christians to Europe, America, Australia. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Christians were fifteen per cent of the population. Now they are just eight per cent." Syria Christians, it seems, often choose to vote with their feet.
Section E:
CONCLUSION
So, quo vadis? Wither goes the Christians of the Middle East? What are their options other than emigration in their quest to live in a free, open, democratic, tolerant society? A respect for the human right, free press, full equality, not worrying from the future. For those who choose to remain in the Middle East (as Syrians, Lebanese, Jordanians, Egyptians, and yes, Iraqis) the challenge will be discovering ways to work with their Muslim neighbors and fellow citizens to build a society, which reflects the aspirations of both communities. Many Christians often feel their Muslim countrymen feel a greater kinship with a stranger in Pakistan than the Christian next door. But then many Muslims likely feel the Christian down the hall has more empathy with an Anglican bloke in Birmingham, England, (or she) does with the folks who attend the local mosque. In Canada there’s a term, which has been used for generations to describe the often-distant aloof relationship between Anglos and the Quebecois: "Two Solitudes." That term, at times, feels very resonant in the Middle East.
But as the above discussion with Syrian men and women attest, there is both a profound desire to form a constructive relationship between the country’s two religious communities, and an equally keen desire not to rock the (political) boat. Both sides share a deep love of their country and a compelling attachment to their "Arabness." But they differ possibly in the depth and nature of their external attachments. More than their Muslim brothers, Christians clearly have a profound connection to the West, and though they often share the anger as Arabs at what they feel is unfair treatment from the US and other Westerners in the region, that anger rarely turns violent and destructive.
Clearly what troubles Arab Christians most is the potential for the region to veer off the path of secularism and democratic reform and back to a narrow intolerant repressive Islamic theocracy. That option is clearly unacceptable to most Christians, and it would likely cause a mass exodus from the region. As the Syrian men and women above demonstrate, there is little interest in a political activist agenda. Throughout history that has often been the "survival strategy" for minorities in societies in transition, or crisis. Sometimes it has tragic results. Think of the Jews of Europe. Or the Muslims of Bosnia. So maybe the time is ripe for Arab Christians to make a clear, consistent, insistent case for secularism and reform throughout the region.
At one point in his book, "In the Name of Identity," Amin Maalouf warns of the dangers of complacency in an era prone to "tribalism." He writes, "If the men of all countries, of all conditions and faiths can so easily be transformed into butchers, if fanatics of all kinds manage so easily to pass themselves off as defenders of identity, it is because the ‘tribal’ concept of identity still prevalent all over the world facilitates such a distortion."(40)
May that not be the fate of ever again of anyone, anywhere, of any faith, color, or creed. For secularism to triumph in Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East, everyone--citizens and politicians--would be well advised to heed the words of the late Antoine Saadeh, i, the founder of the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party, who liked to say, " No differences among religion.” or Kawakbi a Syria who called for the new birth, (Al-Nahda), when he addressed Syrian Christian as follows:
Let’s us forget the past and its errors and let us all acknowledge that religious belongs to God and the homeland belongs to us all. You were the first to arrive to this land and you are the wisest. Let us strive to live together and to build a future. You are not guests in this land; you are in your own country. You are no guest of this language, it is yours and you have done priceless work for it.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bernard Botiveau, The Law of the Nation State and the Status of non-Muslims in Egypt and Syria, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998
Kenneth Cragg, The Arab Christian, A History in the Middle East, Westminster/John Knox Press, Louisville, Kentucky
Dina El Khawaga, The Political Dynamics of the Copts: Giving the Community an Active Role, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998
Khaldun S. al-Husry, Three Reformers, A Study in Modern Arab Political Thought, Khayats, Beirut, 1966
Amin Maalouf, n the Name of Identity, Arcade Publishing, New York
Andrea Pacini, Christian Communities in the Arab Middle East, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998
Bernard Sabella, The Emigration of Christian Arabs: Dimensions and Causes of the Phenomenon, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998
Samir Kamil Samir, The Christian Communities, Active Members of Arab Society Throughout History, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998
INTERVIEWS
Bishop Asador Battikah, Roman Catholic Bishop of Damascus, interviewed in Damacsus, Syria. June 2003.
Hanan Kheir Beik Khaddam, a Journalist, Alawite, interviewed in Damascus Syria. June 2003.
Iskandar Louka, a Christian, Baath Party Activist. interviewed interviewed in Damacsus, Syria. June 2003.
Hussein Odate, a Sunni, the author of the Arab Christian interviewed in Damacsus, Syria. June 2003.
George Ouisheh, Christian, an active member of the Syrian communist party. interviewed in Damascus, Syria. June 2003
Nabil Shweiri, a prominent Christian business man. interviewed in Damascus, Syria. June 2003.
FOOTNOTES
1) Amin Maalouf,
In the Name of Identity, published by Arcade Publishing, New York,
page 17
2) Maalouf, page
17
3) Bernard Sabella,
"The Emigration of Christian Arabs: Dimensions and Causes of the Phenomenon,"
in Christian Communities in the Arab Middle East, The Challenge of the Future,
edited by Andrea Pacini, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, page 129
4) Sabella, page
147
5) Sabella, page
135
6) Sabella, page
152
7) Samir Khalil
Samir, "The Christian Communities, Active Members of Arab Society Throughout
History," in Christian Communities in the Arab Middle East, The Challenge of
the Future, edited by Andrea Pacini, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, page 69
8) Samir, page 72
9) Samir, page 71
10) Andrea Pacini,
Christian Communities in the Arab Middle East, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998,
page 4
11) Pacini, page 5
12) Pacini, page 5
13) Samir, page 75
14) Samir, page 88
15) Khaldun s. al-Husry,
Three Reformer, A Study in Modern Arab Political Thought, Khayats, Beirut,
1966, page viii
16) al-Husry, page
40-41
17) Kenneth Cragg,
The Arab Christian, A History in the Middle East, Westminster/John Knox Press,
Louisville, Kentucky, page 151
18) Cragg, page
151
19) Pacini, page
11
20) Pacini, page
11
21) Pacini, page
11-12
22) Pacini, page
12
23) Cragg, page
161
24) Cragg, page
162
25) Cragg, page
163
26) Bernard
Botiveau, The Law of the Nation State and the Status of non-Muslims in Egypt
and Syria, in Christian Communities in the Arab Middle East, The Challenge of
the Future, edited by Andrea Pacini, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, page 115
27) Botiveau, page
119
28) Botiveau, page
122
29) Pacini, page
13
30) Pacini, page
13
31) Dina El
Khawaga, The Political Dynamics of the Copts: Giving the Community an Active
Role, in Christian Communities in the Arab Middle East, The Challenge of the
Future, edited by Andrea Pacini, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, page 189
32) Pacini, page 17
33) El Khawaga,
page 189
34) The Arab
Christian by Hussiein Odate, published in Damascus,
35) Interview
conducted with Hussein Odate, Author, interview date June 2003, in
Damascus, Syria.
36) Interview
conducted with Dr. Iskandar Louka, who work in the Presidential consultancy
and advisory office in Damascus, Syria. interview date June 2003, in
Damascus, Syria.
37) Interview
conducted with George Ouiesheh, a member of the Communist Party. Interview
date June 2003, in Damascus, Syria.
38) Interview
conducted with Nabil Shweiri a Business Man., interview date June 2003, in
Damascus, Syria.
39) Interview
conducted with Bishop Asador Battikha, Roman Catholic Bishop of Damascus
Catholic Church, interview June 2003, in Damascus, Syria.
40) Interview
conducted with Hanan Kheir Beik Khaddam, Journalist, interview date June
2003, in Damascus, Syria
41) Maalouf, page
29
